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Abstract 
This study is the first attempt to systematically examine the impact of bad 
governance practices in Indonesia on poverty reduction. Indonesia is a country that has 
endured bad governance for a long period, but also has sustained significant poverty 
reduction. Prior to the onset of the economic crisis in mid 1997, the problem of bad 
governance in Indonesia was apparent but mostly ignored because it was compensated 
by high economic growth. The advent of the economic crisis, however, has highlighted 
the seriousness of the problem. This study focuses on the impact of bad governance on 
the poor, the people who are most vulnerable to the impact of bad governance. By 
assembling scattered anecdotal evidence on how past and current practices of bad 
governance in Indonesia have hurt the poor, this study shows that the adverse impact of 
bad governance on the poor is real, systematically affects many people, and undermines 
the efforts to reduce poverty in the country. More systematic evidence on how bad 
governance affects poverty reduction indicates that indeed regions that practice better 
governance experience faster poverty reduction and vice versa.  
 
Keywords:  governance, corruption, poverty, Indonesia  
                                                 
*)
 The authors would like to thank the participants of the workshop on The Asian Development 
Experience: Governance in Asia Revisited, organized by The Japan Institute of International Affairs 
(JIIA), May 4-5, 2003 in Tokyo. We would also like to thank Wenefrida Widyanti for her research 
assistance, the Regional Autonomy Implementation Monitoring Committee (KPPOD), The Institute 
for Economic and Social Research (LPEM – University of Indonesia), and Statistics Indonesia (BPS) 
for providing access to the data. All errors and omissions are ours.  
  ii   
Table of Content 
 
1. Introduction  ……………………………………………………………….. 1 
2. Theories and Definitions of Governance, Poverty Reduction, 
 and Corruption …………...……………………………………………. 2 
2.1. Governance  …………...…………………………………………….. 2 
2.2. Governance and Poverty Reduction  ………………………………… 4 
2.3. Corruption  …………...……………………………………………… 6 
3. Literature Review  ..………………………………………………………… 7 
3.1. Cross-Countries Macroeconomic Studies on Governance and 
 Corruption  …………...……………………………………………… 7 
3.2. Empirical Evidence from Governance and Corruption Research 
 in Indonesia  …………...…………………………………………….. 9 
3.3. Some Possible Flaws in Governance and Corruption Studies  ……… 12 
4. Governance and Poverty in Indonesia: Empirical Evidence  ……………… 13 
4.1. Prologue: Indonesia’s Decentralization  ………….………………….. 13 
4.2. Bad Governance in Action: Anecdotal Evidence  .………………….. 16 
4.2.1. Pre-Crisis Era  …..…………...……………………………… 16 
4.2.2. Decentralization Era  ………...……………………………... 22 
4.2.3. Social Safety Net Program During the Crisis Era  .……….… 27 
4.3. The Impact on Poverty Reduction: More Systematic Evidence  ……. 30 
4.3.1. Methods and Data  …………...…………………………….. 30 
4.3.2. Descriptive Analysis  …………...………………………….. 33 
4.3.3. Multivariate Analysis  …………...…………………………. 35 
5. Concluding Remarks  …..……..……………………………………………. 37 
References  ……………………………………………………………………….. 40 
  1   
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The ongoing economic crisis in Indonesia, which started in mid 1997, has 
brought back attention to the issue of poverty reduction. High economic growth during 
the previous three decades has been successful in reducing absolute poverty in the 
country. Between the early 1970s and the onset of the crisis, the official poverty rate 
was reduced by more than 50 percentage points. Due to the crisis, however, the poverty 
rate doubled, wiping out many years of progress and putting the issue of poverty back 
into prominence.
1
  
At the same time, in searching for the causes of the crisis, the issue of 
governance was brought into the limelight. The hypothesis put forward was that bad 
governance – popularly known as KKN (corruption, collusion, and nepotism) in 
Indonesia – has weakened the Indonesian economy, making it prone to suffer from 
periodic crisis. Corruption was a notorious trademark of the New Order regime, which 
was famous for tolerating petty corruption by low level officials as a means to 
supplement their meager salaries as well as promoting mega corruption by twisting 
government regulations to support the interests of the first-family and their cronies. 
Often this was accompanied by collusion with businesses – domestic as well as foreign 
entities – at the expense of the general public. Nearing its final years, the New Order 
corruption reached its nadir point through the practice of nepotism. Family members 
and close friends of the first-family were appointed in executive as well as legislative 
positions.
2
  
Bad governance during the New Order and its successor governments has made 
Indonesia for a long time tops the list of the most corrupt countries in the world. 
However, prior to the onset of the economic crisis in mid 1997, the problem was mostly 
ignored. This is primarily because the economy was expanding, which was a result of 
the high economic growth experienced by the country. For most people, this was 
enough to compensate the losses and inefficiencies due to the bad governance. The 
advent of the economic crisis, however, has highlighted the seriousness of the problem. 
The People Consultative Assembly (MPR), the highest representative body in 
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Indonesia, even issued a decree on the need to create clean and good governance in the 
country. Efforts to achieve this, however, have so far proved difficult and elusive.
3
  
Recent thinking on poverty reduction and governance argues that both are 
interrelated. Bad governance has made poverty reduction efforts ineffective,
4
 while 
poverty reduction projects provide a fertile ground for corruption.
5
 The consensus that 
emerges from this line of thinking is that good governance is necessary for poverty 
reduction efforts to be effective.  
 The reminder of this paper consists of the following. First, it reviews theories 
and definitions of governance and its links with poverty reduction and corruption. Next, 
it discusses the existing literature on governance, poverty, and corruption, both 
internationally and in the Indonesian context. Then, it proceeds with our research on 
governance and poverty in Indonesia, compiling scattered anecdotal evidences on how 
bad governance has hurt the poor as well as conducting more systematic analysis on 
how governance affects poverty reduction. Finally, this paper provides conclusion and 
policy recommendation based on the findings. 
 
2.  THEORIES AND DEFINITIONS OF GOVERNANCE, POVERTY REDUCTION, 
AND CORRUPTION  
2.1.  Governance 
Governance is an old concept that originates from early democratic political 
theory that discusses what the relationship between the rulers and the people they ruled 
should be like. For instance, in the 19
th
 century Woodrow Wilson defines a government 
that practices good governance as “a government that can properly and succesfully ….. 
with the utmost possible efficiency and at the least possible cost of either money or of 
energy” (cited in Laporte 2002:3).  
However, only in the past decade or so did governance gain significant attention 
in the international policymaking arena. This was motivated by a concern that bilateral 
and multilateral assistance from the developed to developing world had failed to reach 
its goals (i.e. reducing poverty, promote sustainable economic growth, etc.). This was 
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because of poor administrative capacity of the developing countries’ governments to 
administer these projects and widespread corruption. From this, donors concluded that 
good governance is essential for the success of their assistance in the developing world. 
Since then, they have begun linking development assistance to the adoption of good 
government practices by the developing countries.  
There are several definitions of governance that are put forward by different 
bilateral and multilateral lending agencies. Some of them are described here. The World 
Bank (1992) defines good governance as: 
A public service that is efficient, a judicial system that is reliable, and an 
administration that is accountable to its public ..… Good governance, for 
the World Bank, is synonymous with sound development management 
..... [It] is central to creating and sustaining an environment which fosters 
strong and equitable development, and it is an essential complement to 
sound economic policies. 
 
Furthermore, the World Bank (1992) defines three different dimensions of 
governance: First, the form of a political regime (parliamentary or presidential, military 
or civilian, and authoritarian or democratic). Second, the processes by which authority 
is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources; and third, 
the capacity of the government to design, formulate, and implement policies, and, in 
general, to discharge governmental functions.  
In 1995, in a speech that outlined his country’s new policy on foreign assistance 
to developing countries, the United States Vice President Albert Gore, Jr. as cited in 
LaPorte (2002: 4) states the five principles of good governance, which are: (1) The 
administration of the state must be honest and transparent; (2) The administration of the 
state should be streamlined and as efficient as possible; (3) The government must 
decentralize as many functions as possible and deliver services as close to the people as 
possible; (4) Democratic states must make provisions for the security of their people; 
and (5) Democratic states must rely on an open and modern judiciary.  
Meanwhile, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP 1997) defines 
governance as:  
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The exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to 
manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises of the mechanisms, 
processes, and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate 
their interests, exercises their legal rights, meet their obligations, and 
mediate their differences. 
 
Finally, the World Bank economists Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Pablo 
Zoido-Lobation (1999) define governance as: 
….. the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is 
exercised, including (1) the processes by which governments are 
selected, monitored, and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to 
effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect 
of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and 
social interaction among them. 
 
In sum, governance is a multidimensional concept which consists of political, 
economic and sociocultural variables that determine whether public policy designed by 
the government could achieve its intended goals and improve the welfare of society. 
From the various definitions of good governance above, Kinutha-Njenga (date 
unknown) conclude that the practices that are considered to become criteria that a 
country is practicing good governance are as follow:  
(1) The government of the country is democratically elected and promotes/protects 
human rights and the rule of law; (2) There is a strong and healthy civil society 
movement in the country;  (3) The government of the country is able to create and 
implement effective public policy; and (4) The government of the country organizes the 
country’s economy along the premise of free, competitive, and efficient markets. 
 
2.2.  Governance and Poverty Reduction 
Along with the new thinking on governance, donors also incorporate a new 
thinking on poverty and the relations between these two variables. They recognize that 
poverty is a multidimensional concept and is not limited to economic terms alone. 
Beside a lack of income, the poor also suffers from a lack or a complete absence of 
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services (public utilities, public transportation, health care, education, credit, etc.) and a 
lack of participation in social, economic, and political decisions at the local, regional, 
and national level. Because of this, the poor often feel that they are excluded, and 
helpless when their rights are violated and exploited by the wealthy and the powerful 
(Eid 2000).  
Drawing from the experience of more than fifty years of development assistance 
to developing countries, developed countries and multilateral lending institutions now 
conclude that good governance is a necessary prerequisite for poverty reduction, 
because of the following: Firstly, without good governance, the scarce resources 
available are not generally put to their best use in combating poverty. This is often due 
to a lack of transparency, rampant corruption, and an uncertain legal system which 
hinders the economic growth that could help pull the poor out of poverty. Secondly, 
good governance is necessary if all aspects of poverty are to be reduced, not just 
through an increase in income, but also through empowerment and increasing the 
economic, political and social opportunities for the poor (Blaxall 2000; Eid 2000). 
To accomplish these goals, institutions that support governance need to be 
reformed and strengthened. In the past decade, donors have created governance support 
programs that assist developing countries in reforming their civil service and 
strengthening their institutions, with the hope that improved governance will create an 
economic and political climate that will increase economic growth in these countries 
and eventually draw the poor populace out of poverty. For instance, the World Bank 
started its governance program in 1992 and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) started 
a similar program in 1997. On a bilateral level, USAID formally launched its 
governance program in 1995, while DFID (United Kingdom), CIDA (Canada) and GTZ 
(Germany) started their governance program in the early 1990s.  
The focus of these programs are: civil service reform both at the central, regional 
and local government levels, legal and judicial system reform, legislative institutions 
reform, capacity building of NGOs and other civil society organizations, and 
government efficiency and effectiveness reform (LaPorte 2002; Eid 2000). On 
improving the welfare of the poor, the World Bank’s governance reform program has 
four aims: (1) Empowering the poor; (2) Improving the capacity of the poor by 
improving basic services; (3) Providing economic opportunities by increasing access to 
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markets; and (4) Providing security from economic shocks and from corruption, crime, 
and violence (Blaxall 2000). 
It is hoped that through these programs, the goal of lasting poverty reduction and 
improved governance in the developing world can be finally achieved. 
 
2.3.  Corruption 
Corruption, as the opposite of good governance, is defined by the World Bank as 
the abuse of public office for private gain. Corruption scholar Robert Klitgaard 
hypothesizes that corruption is more likely to occur in an environment where officials 
have monopolistic control over state resources and a high level of discretion over who 
can gain access to those resources, while at the same time the mechanisms for holding 
these officials accountable for their actions are weak or non-existent.
6
 It is widely 
recognized today as a symptom of poor governance and a major obstacle to poverty 
reduction efforts. While in the past, some argued that corruption could increase 
economic efficiency in countries with burdensome regulations and a dominant 
government role in the economy,
7
 today most scholars studying corruption believe that 
it curbs economic growth, degrades social and political institutions, and hinders efforts 
toward poverty reduction. Especially for the poor, corruption could create adverse 
consequences for them, both directly and indirectly.  
There are some avenues through which corruption makes poverty reduction 
efforts ineffective: (1) Corruption diverts funds for poverty reduction to the pockets of 
corrupt officials; (2) Corruption twists the budget allocation away from poverty 
reduction to other projects more closely associated with the interests of corrupt officials’ 
(3) Corruption creates a high-cost economy, obstructs the creation of a healthy and 
conducive economic environment, which is essential for the poor to work and do 
business; (4) Corruption jeopardizes the property rights of the poor, since corrupt 
officials often force the poor out of their homes and off their land, so that they can be 
used for development projects sponsored by the developers who bribed them; and (5) 
Corruption prevents the poor from getting justice in the court, since corrupt court 
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officials sell their decisions to the highest bidder, which makes court decisions biased 
toward wealthier parties. 
Corruption also hurts the poor indirectly through:  
(1) Increasing the prices of goods and services that need to be paid for by the poor; (2) 
Reducing incomes of the poor by way of semi-legal and illegal taxes and levies; (3) 
Diverting support measures provided for the poor from the hands of the poor to 
ineligible parties; (4) Creating asset-ownership inequality, since the wealthy can 
influence the government to pursue policies that will increase their wealth (such as 
favorable tax treatments and exchange rates) that are not available to the poor; and (5) 
Discouraging the poor from making new investments or opening new businesses, 
because they know that the well-connected business people will always win government 
projects and contracts due to corruption. As a result, they can not increase their living 
standards, but remain poor. 
In sum, there is a strong consensus that good governance is necessary for poverty 
reduction efforts to be effective and for reducing corruption.  
 
3.  LITERATURE REVIEW  
3.1.  Cross-Countries Macroeconomic Studies on Governance and Corruption 
There has been an explosion of literature that studies the impact of corruption 
and governance on economic growth and various economic and social indicators in the 
past decade or so. These studies use cross-country data on corruption and data on 
perceptions of governance collected by both commercial firms that measure political 
risk for their clients (such as Political Risk Services, Inc) and by International 
Governmental and Non-Governmental organizations (The World Bank, Transparency 
International).  
A landmark World Bank study done by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton 
(1999), which for the first time combined the various governance and political risk 
indices that measure variables such as political rights, civil liberties, government 
effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law, and graft/corruption into a single index 
found that good governance does matter for economic outcomes. For example, they 
found that one-standard deviation increase in any one of the governance indicators 
caused between a two and a half, and four-fold increase in per capita income, between a 
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two and a half and four-fold decrease in infant mortality, and a 15 to 25 percent increase 
in literacy. This study shows with clear evidence that good governance is very crucial 
for economic growth and improved social indicators.  
Another study by Rajkumar and Swaroop (2002) found that efficiency in public 
spending reduced child/infant mortality and increased educational attainment and is 
positively related to governance. It is more effective if governance is good and less 
effective if governance is poor. They conclude that well-functioning public institutions 
are critical for translating public spending into effective services. 
Several studies that have linked corruption and good governance with economic 
and social indicators find that there is an inverse relationship between them. Good 
governance increases these indicators while corruption decreases them. For instance, 
Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terne (1998) found that an increase of corruption by one 
standard deviation is associated with an increase in Gini coefficient of about 4.4 
percentage points and a reduction in income growth for the bottom 20% of population 
by 7.8 percentage points per year. Meanwhile, Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson (2000) 
found that better health and education outcomes-measured by child mortality and drop-
out rates-are correlated with lower corruption, while countries with high corruption have 
worse health outcomes compared with countries with low corruption.  
Finally, Huther and Shah (1998) found that decentralized countries have better 
governance than the more centralized countries. They shows that citizen participation 
and public sector accountability go hand-in-hand with decentralization of public sector 
decision making. Decentralized countries are more responsive to a citizen’s preferences 
in service delivery and strive harder to serve people than centralized countries. 
Furthermore, fiscal decentralization goes hand-in-hand with an increase in the human 
development index and a decrease in income inequality.  
However, to conclude that decentralization per se will increase public 
participation and accountability and result in better public services is a fallacy. A study 
done by Crook and Sverrison (2001) found that only in countries with well-established 
public participation schemes, local government that practices good governance and is 
capable in delivering good quality services to the public, and functioning checks and 
balances mechanisms from both the central government and the general public, that 
decentralization could be considered successful. In contrast, decentralization without a 
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local government that practices good governance and is accountable to the public would 
not be successful in achieving its intended goals. 
 
3.2.  Empirical Evidence from Governance and Corruption Research in Indonesia 
Since the fall of the New Order, there has been a lot of interest in finding out 
about the numerous aspects of corruption in Indonesia, the exact level of corruption in 
Indonesia and its implications for Indonesians, especially for the poor. There is also a 
strong interest to find out whether anti-corruption and good governance reform 
proposals created by the Indonesian government since “reformasi” began in 1998 has 
made any impacts on actually reducing the level of corruption. Regional autonomy, that 
has been implemented in Indonesia since 2001, has also helped to focus attention on 
corruption and governance at the local level, since many parties have feared that along 
with fiscal decentralization, corruption will also be decentralized from the central to the 
local level. Both the donor agencies, research institutions, and civil society groups have 
conducted several studies on the above topics. Some of their findings are summarized 
below. 
Research on the impact of anti-corruption reforms in Indonesia has shown that, 
so far, they have been ineffective in actually reducing corruption in Indonesia. In fact, 
one could argue that since 1998 corruption has actually gotten worse. For example, 
corruption has now spread into the parliament, the institution that is supposed to be a 
watchdog on the executive branch. While the Indonesian government has made changes 
that has promoted democracy and free press in the country, instituting legal reforms
8
, 
and creating greater fiscal and financial transparency, Hamilton-Hart (2001) finds that 
these reforms have been ineffective in actually reducing corruption in Indonesia. 
Furthermore, they have failed to result in successful prosecution of any major 
defendants that were accused of corruption. She believes that these reform measures are 
ineffective because corruption has become so entrenched in Indonesia that no one 
within the Indonesian government is really interested in seriously fighting corruption 
because such an act would only hurt their own rent-seeking interests.  
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Sherlock (2002) confirms this conclusion by pointing out that the two new 
bodies dedicated to monitor and fight corruption – the Indonesian Ombundsman’s 
Commission (KON) and the State Official’s Assets Auditing Commission (KPKPN) – 
were given neither adequate funding nor effective power to conduct thorough 
investigations and prosecute corrupt officials by the government decrees that mandate 
their creations. He hypothesizes that this is done deliberately so that these commissions 
would only become “toothless tigers” that would not seriously combat corruption in 
Indonesia and, therefore, the practice of corruption done by government officials in all 
levels would continue uninterrupted. Thus, he concludes that merely creating new anti-
corruption bodies would not have any actual impact in reducing corruption if there is no 
political will to make sure that these bodies would function effectively as stated in the 
statutes that created them.  
The Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia (PGRI) has conducted a 
national opinion survey on how public officials, businesses, and the public at large, 
perceived the level of public sector corruption in Indonesia.
9
 The study found that 75% 
of the public regarded public sector corruption to be very common and that 65% of 
respondents reported that they have experienced corruption involving public officials. 
The institutions that are perceived as corrupt by the people sampled are the traffic 
police, custom officials, and the judiciary. The study estimated that about 48% of all 
public officials have received unofficial payments, with bureaucrats from the 
Departments of Housing, Industry and Trade, and Home Affairs as more likely to 
receive such payments. It is also found that corruption imposes high cost on the society: 
up to 5% of household income was used to pay bribes to public officials and 35% of 
business enterprises reported that they have not made new investments due to the high 
cost created by corruption.  
The Institute for Economic and Social Research (LPEM) at the University of 
Indonesia recently conducted research on the business climate in 60 district/city 
governments (LPEM 2001). It conducted interviews with the owners and managers of 
1,736 medium and large-sized companies. The study finds that regional autonomy has 
increased business uncertainty and the cost of doing business at the local level 
(measured through the increase in the unofficial payments made by businesses). It also 
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finds that extra payments made to government officials does not necessarily reduce 
economic efficiency but rather increases it, since often businesses have to spend more 
time and paperwork when they are dealing with government officials, even with the 
unofficial payments. However, the report also discovered that the frequency that 
unofficial payments must be made is lower in the districts that have better regulations 
and better governance, so there is evidence that good governance does decrease 
corruption. However, the ability of the districts to generate their own revenue does not 
correlate with better governance, because of the these districts are more prone to higher 
levels of unofficial payments and corruption. 
Another regional-level business climate survey was conducted by the Regional 
Autonomy Implementation Monitoring Committee (KPPOD) in 2002. It selected 90 
regions (68 districts and 22 cities) and measured the business climate of these regions 
by measuring their security, economic potential, human resources, local government’s 
culture, infrastructure quality, local government’s regulations (Perda), and regional 
finances. The study used both primary sources (interviews with business executives, 
journalists, and economic experts) and secondary sources (news accounts and 
information from the public). It found that regions that attract more businesses are more 
likely to have better security, better local government’s culture and regulations, and 
better human resources, which confirms the assertion that good governance is necessary 
condition for businesses to invest in a region. 
 Finally, a study on how public participation affects the level of corruption in 
local government projects, using the World Bank’s Kecamatan Development Program 
(KDP) as a case study shows that corruption occurred in KDP projects because of the 
existence of incentives and opportunities to commit corruption. These included a 
monopoly over the decision-making process, lack of transparency, and low probability 
of getting caught and punished. Village people who are well informed about KDP, its 
goals, and are participating in its planning, are more likely to challenge corrupt practices 
done by local government officials (Woodhouse 2001). Thus, this study confirms that if 
the public are actively involved in the planning of government projects that are intended 
to benefit their communities, they are more likely to speak up when they detect corrupt 
practices. This hopefully will deter corrupt practices occurring in the future. 
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3.3.  Some Possible Flaws in Governance and Corruption Studies 
There are several caveats that one needs to consider when reviewing these 
studies. First, the data that is required to construct a good governance study is often hard 
to find (and for the prevalence of corruption, objective data is impossible to find). Even 
if found, often it would not satisfactorily explain all the dimensions of good governance, 
since as noted above, it is a multidimensional concept with multiple interpretations. 
Since there is no single variable that could measure governance, subjective or proxy 
indicators are used instead to measure it, which means that the variables the studies used 
are not really the ones that the studies intended to measure. As a result, an 
inexperienced researcher could be “fooled” by the data, that is, they may think they are 
measuring one thing when in fact they are measuring another, or they could think that 
they are measuring a direct, first order effect between two variables when in effect they 
are second or third order variables (Dethier 1999:37-38; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-
Lobaton 1999:2).  
On the other hand, if a study only focuses on a single country, these problems 
could be minimized because it is possible to focus the study on a small number of policy 
variables that are easier to observe. However, at this time single country governance 
studies are not as plentiful as cross country studies, even though the number of these 
types of studies is growing (Dethier1999: 46-47). 
In regard to the studies about governance in Indonesia mentioned above, the fact 
that the LPEM and KPPOD studies are based on the opinions by a selected panel of 
experts (such as business owners, journalists, and NGO leaders) that might not be 
representative of the general public as a whole could cause concern. This is because 
some of them might possess opinions that are not shared by the public at large or they 
may have information that is either out of date or inaccurate regarding the regions that 
are being studied. This may occur because they lack a comprehensive understanding of   
these regions. The PGRI study has more validity because its sample is derived from the 
general public instead of a group of experts, however it is only a public opinion study 
regarding the pervasiveness of corruption in Indonesia and does not ask more specific 
questions about certain aspects of governance and corruption (such as the quality of 
local regulations) that are being asked in the other studies. 
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4.  GOVERNANCE AND POVERTY IN INDONESIA: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
This paper is the first attempt to review the relationship between good 
governance and poverty in Indonesia, where the paradox has been very profound. 
During the three decades of the authoritarian New Order Government in Indonesia 
starting in the late 1960s, the country endured various forms of blatant bad governance. 
Petty corruption as well as mega-corruption were incredibly entrenched and pervasive 
in the bureaucracy. Yet, at the same time, the country enjoyed a very significant 
reduction in absolute poverty. This reduction in poverty was driven mainly by high 
economic growth experienced by the country during this period.  
The paradox between bad governance and poverty reduction experienced 
simultaneously by the country makes the effort to sort out the impact of bad governance 
on poverty a difficult undertaking. Therefore, the strategy adopted in this study is to 
utilize variations across districts in their governance practices and the poverty reduction 
that occurred. The adoption of a wide-ranging decentralization and regional autonomy 
policy starting in 2001 is beneficial to this strategy as such a policy tends to enhance 
differences across regions. The first part of this section provides a prologue on the 
decentralization and regional autonomy policy. It is followed by anecdotal evidence of 
how the practices of bad governance hurt the poor. The final section investigates the 
impact of governance on poverty reduction using district level data.  
 
4.1.  Prologue: Indonesia’s Decentralization 
Indonesia’s decentralization and regional autonomy policy – which is stipulated 
in Law No. 22/1999 on Local Government and Law No. 25/1999 on Central-Regional 
Fiscal Balance, which both were enacted in January 2001 – involves not only 
administrative but also political and fiscal decentralization. Figure 1 describes the basic 
structure of authorities and functions of the central, provincial, and district governments 
stipulated in both laws. These laws have reversed the New Order’s centralized 
approach. Now the responsibilities and functions of the district governments are by and 
large expanded, while those of the central and provincial governments are reduced.  
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Figure 1.  Basic Structure of Government Authorities According to Law No. 22/1999 
 
According to Law No. 22/1999, all government authorities are now the authority 
of autonomous region, except for five authorities which remains with the central 
government. These are: foreign affairs, defense and security, justice, fiscal and 
monetary affairs, religious affairs, and other authorities.
10
 Authorities of provincial 
governments include all authorities with inter-districts coverage, authorities delegated 
                                                 
10
 There are many critiques about this clause because of its ambivalent nature.   
  Central 
Government 
 Provincial 
Government 
 Municipal 
Government 
  Sub-district 
 
Urban Village 
 District 
Government 
  Sub-district 
 
Village 
 Decentralization 
 Deconcentration 
 Co-administration 
  15   
by the central government, and all authorities beyond the capability of district 
governments.
11
  
Since the emphasis of decentralization and regional autonomy policy lies with 
the district governments, authorities given to the districts are very wide-ranging. In this 
respect, Law No. 22/1999 grants authorities to district governments which include all 
other authorities which have not been covered by the central and provincial 
governments. These include: public works, health, education and culture, agriculture, 
transportation, industry and trade, investment, environment, land, cooperative, and labor 
matters.  
In line with the expanded local government authorities and functions prescribed 
by Law No. 22/1999, Law No. 25/1999 sets a new inter-governmental fiscal framework, 
by drastically changing the disbursement arrangement. A much larger transfer in the 
form of Dana Perimbangan (the equalization fund) replaced the Subsidy for 
Autonomous Regions (SDO) and the Grants to Local Governments (Inpres 
Kabupaten/Kota and Inpres Desa) programs. The equalization fund consists of three 
parts:  
1. Revenue sharing. The intended purpose of this component is to overcome/reduce 
vertical imbalance/inequality. This component is introduced in response to the 
demands of the rich-resource regions for a fair share of revenues extracted from their 
regions.  
2. General allocation fund (DAU). This is a block grant intended to equalize fiscal 
capacities of regional governments to finance their expenditure needs. The law 
specifies that DAU should at least make up 25 percent of the central government 
revenue and must be distributed among local governments by a formula which takes 
into account regional needs and potential capacity. In the fiscal year 2001, DAU 
accounted for around 74 percent of the equalization fund.  
3. Special allocation fund (DAK). This is an earmark grant that is developed to 
finance special needs that either cannot be determined by formula used for DAU 
allocations or categorized as national priorities and commitments.  
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 Specifically, authorities of  the provincial government are regulated under Government Regulation 
(Peraturan Pemerintah) No. 25, 2000 regarding the Authority of the Central and Provincial 
Governments as Autonomous Regions. 
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4.2.  Bad Governance in Action: Anecdotal Evidence 
4.2.1.  Pre-Crisis Era 
This section presents anecdotal evidences on how bad governance hurts the poor 
during the pre-crisis era. One source of the anecdotal evidences discussed was 
Montgomery et al. 2002, which focus on the agricultural sector, i.e. the sector where 
most of the poor in Indonesia find their livelihoods. In February 1999, the agricultural 
sector had the highest sectoral poverty rate as well as held the largest number of poor 
people in the country. The agriculture sector’s 1999 head-count poverty rate was 39.7%, 
and more than 58.4% of the total of poor people gave their primary field of occupation 
as agriculture.
12
 During the economic crisis, agriculture was the only sector to absorb 
large numbers of the newly unemployed. While other sectors shrank, employment in 
agriculture rose by 13% or 4.6 million people in just one year, from 34.8 million in 
1997 to 39.4 million in 1998.  
During the 1980s and much of the 1990s, there was growing concern about the 
welfare of farmers, based on perceptions that farmers received an increasingly smaller 
percentage of the final prices for their goods. Incentives to supply the market seemed to 
be falling over time. Indonesia’s economy was not an internal free trade area. The 
problems fell into two categories, price distortions and non-price distortions. Provincial 
and district taxes (pajak) and levies (retribusi) on agricultural trade led to distorted 
prices. Some of the taxes and levies were legal, but many were not. Among non-price 
distortions, regulatory controls on national, provincial and district agricultural 
production and agricultural trade created local monopolies and monopsonies. Other 
controls such as central government livestock inter-island shipping maximum levels and 
quota rights presented barriers to entry and restricted competition. Once the regulations 
were abolished or could be ignored, monopoly and monopsony power disappeared. 
Provincial and district governments do not have the authority to tax income or 
assets.  All of them have therefore turned to taxing trade. Regulations authorizing 
provincial or district governments to apply taxes or levies are officially issued by local 
parliaments (DPRD). But in the past, most such regulations were drafted by local 
administrations, then approved by DPRDs without serious review. Seldom were 
elements of civil society presented with a chance at hearings or feedback on draft 
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revenue legislation before enactment. Trade levies and charges for government-
provided services became an important revenue base available to local governments. 
They became dependent on this restricted fiscal base. Local levies called retribusi had a 
more serious impact than local taxes. Such levies were originally intended by law to be 
a form of cost-recovery to government, a user-charge for facilities or services provided. 
Over time retribusi levies were extended to include compensation to government for 
extraction of non-renewable natural resource products (since all natural resources 
belong to the people of Indonesia). The definition of natural resource products (hasil 
bumi) then was extended to include agriculture, which is renewable and not owned by 
government. In fact retribusi levies became a trade tax on goods shipped outside of a 
district. Levies mushroomed. Trucks were stopped at retribusi posts every few 
kilometers along the road. The levies were against physical quantities traded, with no 
link to profitability, net income or value-added. Ability-to-pay (the level of income of 
the original producing farmer) was also not taken into account. Methods of collection 
(stopping trucks along isolated rural roads) led to abuse; much of the money collected 
did not make its way into official coffers. Agricultural product prices became badly 
distorted by retribusi levies. The impact of levies was highest for products from 
forestry, livestock and fisheries.  
The first significant reform of local taxes and levies came with the passage of a 
central government revenue Law No. 18/97 that restricted the types of local taxes and 
retribusi levies permitted. It reduced regional taxes from the existing 42 to 9. It also 
reduced retribusi levies from the existing 192 items to only 30. 
Government at all levels created, inspired and supported local monopolies, 
monopsonies and inter-regional trade quotas for the favored few. These distortions 
drove wedges between farm-gate prices (driving them lower) and destination market 
prices (driving them higher). The price difference (“rent”) was to the advantage of the 
holder of the monopoly, monopsony, or quota right. Benefits of these price wedges were 
shared with the people who gave such rights. Many were specifically created to benefit 
the children or cronies of the then first-family. The following describes several specific 
examples of the practices of bad governance. 
Oranges from West Kalimantan. Until the early 1990s citrus production was 
increasing rapidly in West Kalimantan, from just 76,000 tons in 1988 to 199,800 tons in 
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1991/92.  Almost all West Kalimantan’s citrus production was shipped to Java. In 1991 
the West Kalimantan Governor issued a decree stating that PT Bima Citra Mandiri (a 
member of the Bimantara group controlled by a son of the then first-family) was 
appointed to be the official “coordinator” of all citrus trade. All citrus trade had to pass 
through KUDs (Koperasi Unit Desa, Village Unit Cooperatives). Farmers could sell 
only to KUD-appointed collection-traders, who were then required to sell to Bima Citra 
Mandiri for inter-island trade. Farm-gate prices dropped precipitately. Exports from the 
province fell by 63%. Angry orange producers brought truckloads of oranges into 
Pontianak and dumped them in front of government offices in protest. Many orange 
producers abandoned their trees, not tending them since. The 1991 monopsony right 
granted to PT Bimantara Citra Mandiri was abolished by a Governor’s decree that 
“encouraged” (but no longer required) marketing through KUD cooperatives. But the 
orange trade has never recovered. 
Required local processing of cocoa and cashew nuts in South Sulawesi. Cocoa 
and cashew nuts are important export crops for Sulawesi. They are particularly 
important in isolated upland poverty districts that do not have much flat or gently rolling 
land suitable for rice or other grain cultivation. For instance in Polmas district, in the 
hilly northwestern part of South Sulawesi, there were 27,764 hectares of cocoa, grown 
by 43,361 families in 1998, about 30% of all Polmas farm families. Polmas had a 
smaller area of cashew (2,914 ha) but it was the main source of income for another 
6,700 poor upland farm families. In another poor area surveyed, Bone district, cocoa 
was important for 25,192 farm families (27% of all farm families), who operated 10,490 
hectares of cocoa trees. In Bone, cashew was the main source of income for another 
11,706 families (13%) who tended 9,050 hectares of cashew trees.  
South Sulawesi’s smallholder plantation crop producers were faced with a 
regulation that required cocoa beans and cashew nuts to be processed within the 
province. The largest cashew nut processing factory in Ujung Pandang benefiting from 
the regulation was PT Citra Sekarwangi Agro Persada, part of the Citra group and 
owned by a daughter of the then first-family. Cashew nut buyers wanted unprocessed 
cashew nuts (for export in the raw state to lower-cost processors in India) and were 
willing to pay higher prices than South Sulawesi’s cashew processing factories were 
willing to pay. Also the main cocoa bean importing country, the United States, wants 
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only unfermented cocoa beans. Required local processing in this case was not value-
adding but instead was value-subtracting. 
After experiencing the impact of de facto deregulation, the cocoa bean and 
cashew nut processing industries tried again in 1999 to ask government to force high-
cost local processing. It requested the government to impose a 20% to 30% export tax 
on unprocessed cocoa beans and cashew nuts to help guarantee supplies of raw 
materials to existing (favored) processing factories. By this time elements of civil 
society were more vocal about the impact of government-created marketing restrictions. 
Many saw this move as one-sided, helping local processing firms but harming farmers, 
forcing down the farm-gate price received. The Cocoa Association of Indonesia 
(Askindo) objected strongly to the proposal, as did both the Indonesian Farmers Union 
(HKTI) and the Association of Indonesian Food and Beverage Producers. Only the 
Cashew Nut Industry Association of Indonesia supported the move to impose an export 
tax. The secretary-general of this association stated that the farm-gate price of cashew 
nuts was rocketing upward, benefiting the farmers, to the detriment of processors.  As of 
July 2001, it appears that the lobbying by the Association has not been successful and 
there are no new export taxes on cashew nuts. There are also no new export taxes on 
cocoa beans.  
Clove Marketing. Cloves were an important source of income for upland 
farming areas in Sulawesi. For instance in impoverished Polmas in South Sulawesi, 
cloves were the main source of income for 2,000 farming families (growing 882 ha). In 
another district studied in South Sulawesi (Bone), cloves were also important, grown by 
5,776 families operating about 4,000 hectares. Cloves were even more important in 
North Sulawesi. A total of 43,000 hectares was planted to cloves, but by the period just 
before deregulation only 20,000 ha were productive, producing just 7,000 tons. The 
remaining 23,000 hectares of clove plantations had been largely abandoned because of 
the disincentive effect of low farm gate prices. 
Before deregulation, clove producers were required to sell their clove output to a 
much-criticized Clove Marketing Board (Badan Penyangga Pemasaran Cengkeh or 
BPPC), controlled by another son of the then first-family. Clove prices at the producer 
level plummeted, but clove prices to the kretek cigarette manufacturers in Java did not 
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fall commensurately. There was suspicion of super-normal profits made by the BPPC 
monopsony right holder, whose accounts were never made transparent. 
The measures taken to break the power of the clove marketing board appear to 
have been both complete and effective. Presidential Decree No. 21/1998 established the 
right of all farmers to sell cloves to anyone, and for traders to buy cloves from all agents 
at a freely determined market price. An instruction letter from the Minister of Industry 
and Trade supported this Presidential Decree. The National Clove Board wound up its 
affairs by the end of June 1998, after which time supervision of clove trade became the 
responsibility of the Director General of Domestic Trade. A site investigation in North 
Sulawesi showed no residual trace of the Clove Support and Marketing Board 
monopsony. Farmers and traders said the trade is now free from interference by the 
government. 
Smallholder Tea Processing in West Java. Tea is an important export crop for 
Indonesia. Exports in 1998 earned $108 million. West Java is the most important 
producing province. In the 1980s PT Tehnusamba Indah, a company controlled by a 
crony of the then first-family, built four tea-processing factories in West Java, a region 
known already to have excess processing capacity (tea area had declined over the 
years). Farmers said Tehnusamba’s factories offered lower prices than competitors for 
fresh tea leaves and so they declined to sell to them. In 1990 the Governor of West Java 
issued a letter instructing District Heads to implement rayonisasi, or market 
“rationalisation”, which prescribed area allocations for the collective buying of fresh tea 
leaves. The District Heads in turn issued letters telling farmers near Tehnusamba 
factories to sell only to Tehnusamba, thus creating a local monopsony position.  
The letter from the Governor of West Java requiring this geographic market 
allocation for fresh tea-leaves has never been formally withdrawn. Also district 
government market-area-allocation letters in favor of Tehnusamba have not been 
cancelled. But farmers now disregard these instructions and sell to whomever they want. 
This is one example where legislation was created to benefit private parties with 
political clout.  
Inter-Island Livestock Trade. Inter-island livestock trade is important for farmers 
in the dry provinces of West and East Nusa Tenggara. These relatively poor islands 
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export livestock, mostly to Java. In 1998 NTT had a large livestock population of 
803,000 head (almost all cattle). Producing slaughter cattle for market was important to 
more than 200,000 NTT farmers (although this is merely a rough estimate). In NTB the 
large livestock population was 470,000 head and was a major source of income for 
more than an estimated  150,000 farmers. Mostly of NTB’s cattle were on Lombok 
Island (280,000 head).  
Livestock trade was subject to both local trade taxes and inter-island shipping 
quotas. By mid 1997, just before the crisis, East Nusa Tenggara cattle farmers and 
traders had to pay a total of US$ 40 per head through 16 different kinds of taxes and 
levies, amounting to about 13% of the farm-gate value of a slaughter animal. On 
Lombok Island in West Nusa Tenggara  farmers and traders paid 24 different taxes and 
retribusi on livestock trade: 3 to central government, 9 to the province and 12 to the 
district. The total cost was about $31 per head in taxes and levies, or 5% of the $570 
farm-gate value of a typical slaughter animal. In Bima (Sumbawa Island), traders and 
farmers had to pay the same 3 central and 9 provincial taxes and levies, plus 18 district 
charges. In South Sulawesi traders bringing cattle from Bone to Ujung Pandang (5 hours 
away) had to pay 31 different taxes and levies along the road. Of these, 6 were legal and 
25 illegal. Twenty of the posts charging illegal levies were police and military 
checkpoints. The sum paid represented about 4% of the farm gate value of the typical 
animal. A tandem-trailer truck carrying 18 head of cattle from Bone to Ujung Pandang 
had to be prepared to pay $228 in taxes and levies. 
Until deregulation in 1998, the Ministry of Agriculture’s Director General of 
Livestock set inter-island livestock trade quotas. These severely limited the number that 
could be marketed to at most about 5% to 6% of the local livestock populations. In fact, 
a well-managed herd in NTT should be able to reach between 10% and 13% off-take 
from a stable livestock population (ACIAR, January 1998) under extensive grazing, not 
intensive stall-feeding management systems. Each year the DG issued a letter giving 
provinces annual maximum quotas for shipments. He even determined destinations (not 
permitting NTT to ship to East Kalimantan despite high prices and a shortage of beef 
for instance). Trade was restricted. The cattle quota for NTT kept decreasing each year, 
from 67,000 head in 1994 to only 41,000 head in 1997.  The livestock populations were 
increasing, but the opportunity to market was decreasing. Livestock (and meat) prices in 
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Jakarta rose and farm-gate prices in the outer islands fell as a result of this quota system. 
A large price wedge was formed, that benefited only the inter-island shipping quota-
right holders.  
 
4.2.2.  Decentralization Era 
Efforts to reform various market distortions that proliferated in the 1980s and 
1990s gained momentum between 1998 and 2000, in particular after the fall of the New 
Order government. This is understandable as many of the distortions were created by or 
related to the then first-family or their cronies. These reforms have had some successes, 
resulting in improving prices received by farmers. However, the implementation of a 
wide-ranging decentralization and regional autonomy policy – which granted much 
power to district government – starting in 2001 seems to have reversed the trend. 
Various forms of market distortions, which have been dismantled previously, now have 
revived. The only difference is that now most of the distortions are created by the 
district governments rather than the central government as has been the case in the past. 
This section discusses some examples of the new forms of bad governance but with 
same adverse consequences for the poor. 
The costs of transporting goods from North Sumatra to Jakarta.
13
 The abundant 
agricultural commodities from the Karo district in North Sumatra are mostly perishable 
goods. Therefore, it is crucial to secure smooth and rapid distribution of these goods to 
maintain both the quality and the selling price at the consumer level. Consequently, 
farmers and traders will make every effort to expedite the delivery of these goods to the 
buyers, even if they have to pay various taxes and levies en route. These additional 
charges will add to the distribution cost, and eventually will lead to a higher price at the 
consumer level.  The amount of the levies extracted is determined by measuring the 
tonnage of the truck at various weighing stations along the routes. Table 1 illustrates the 
number of weighing bridges and the amount of taxes and levies paid by a truck driver at 
each location traveling from Kabajahe, Karo district to Jakarta. A truck driver who 
regularly carries oranges from Kabupaten Karo to Jakarta reports that there are at least 
16 truck weighing stations and several other levy checkpoints that have to be passed 
along the route.  The table shows the number and amount of “fines” paid by truck 
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drivers – both those who comply and those who do not comply with the weight limit at 
each station. 
 
TABLE 1   
The Costs Incurred by Truck Drivers at Weighing Stations on the Way from North 
Sumatra to Jakarta 
 
Province Number of 
Stations 
Amount of fines Remarks 
1. North Sumatra   4 Rp5,000 – 10,000 for 
each ton of excess weight  
Per ton of excess weight  
2. Riau 2 Rp60,000, paid by all, 
irrespective of weight 
trucks. 
Fines have to be paid by both 
complying and non-complying 
vehicles, plus additional road 
levies:   
-Rp2,500 (6-ton truck)  
-Rp3,500 (8-ton truck) 
3 .Jambi 2 Rp60,000, paid by all 
trucks   
Plus additional road levies: 
-Rp2,500 (6-ton truck)  
-Rp3,500 (8-ton truck) 
4. South Sumatra   
       
5 Fine of Rp15,000 for 
each ton of excess weight  
In addition to the possibility of 
receiving a fine, there are also 
road levies:   
-Rp2,500 (6-ton truck)  
-Rp3,500 (8-ton truck)  
5. Lampung 3 Fine of Rp15,000 for 
each ton of excess weight 
In addition to the possibility of 
receiving a fine, there are also  
road levies:   
-Rp2,500 (6-ton truck)  
-Rp3,500 (8-ton truck)  
 
It is estimated that the total amount of levies (official and non-official) paid to 
transport oranges from Kabanjahe to Jakarta ranges from Rp268,500 to Rp1,008,500.  
Paying the lowest amount would only be possible if the truck complies with its 
permitted capacity. Nevertheless, even when trucks comply with the regulations 
frequently drivers still have to pay levies. As a result it is common for truck drivers 
prefer to carry loads that exceed the trucks legal capacity. The estimated value of the 
load of one 8-ton truck of oranges transporting approximately 120 baskets @ 65 kg at 
the farm gate price of Rp1,800 for grade A, B, C, and D oranges is Rp14,400,000.  
Hence, the total value of the transported goods paid out in taxes and levies is between 
2% to 7%.  
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Heavily taxed plantation sector in North Sumatra.
14
 While the North Sumatra 
provincial government has not profited directly from the plantation sector, the 
commodities produced in this industry have been the target of various levies, at the both 
the local (kabupaten) and the central level of government. Levies are imposed on the 
plantation industry starting at the production level, through to distribution and 
marketing of their products.  According to the latest inventory released by the 
management of the Association of Indonesian Rubber Producers (Gapkindo) in North 
Sumatra, there are at least nine kinds of official levies imposed on rubber commodities 
(see Table  2). 
TABLE 2   
Types of official levies on rubber commodities in North Sumatra 
 
Activities  Types of levies  Tariff and location  Remarks/Problems  
 
 
 
Production 
support 
 
Land and   
Building Tax  
Rp60-130 thousand/ha Tax valuation too high, 
annual increases  
Street lighting Tax  
 
10% of total electricity 
capacity used, in certain 
kabupaten/kota  
 
Tax base too high.  Also 
applied to electricity 
generators installed in the 
premises.  
 3.   Ground and 
Surface Water Levies  
Rp2-5.4 million/month  
 4.   Hinder 
Ordonantie Tax  
Rp4.2 million/year in Deli 
Serdang 
Rp1.75 million/renewable 
 
 
Processing 
 5. Fees for taking 
Effluent Samples  
Rp450 thousand/sample, 3 
samples/month in South 
Tapanuli  
The official charge from 
the Department of Health 
Laboratory is only Rp44 
thousand/sample. 
 
 
Marketing  
 6. Market Levies  Rp6/kg in Asahan 
Rp20/kg in Langkat 
Rp3/kg in Deli Serdang 
 
 7.  Compulsory 
Contributions from 
Plantation Estates  
Rp10/kg in Asahan  
 
 
Others 
 8. Levies on the 
logging or use of 
Rubber Timber  
Rp300/m3 in Deli Serdang  
 9. Compulsory Third 
Party Contributions  
Voluntary at provincial level   
10. Levies from the Department of Manpower   
Sources: Gapkindo North Sumatra, 2001. 
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Non-Tariff Trade Restriction in North Sulawesi.
15
 The implementation of 
decentralization and regional autonomy has resulted in several major changes in the way 
that local governments exercise their autonomous rights.  One of these changes has been 
that local governments are creating a larger number of new local laws. In the case of 
North Sulawesi, so far only the provincial governments have begun to create regulations 
that result in non-tariff barriers. However, there are also indications that district 
governments are also proposing to create non-tariff regulations at this level. The 
following is an example of non-tariff barrier found in the Province of North Sulawesi 
concerning regulation on pharmacies, outlined in the Governor’s Decree No.4dz/03/891, 
13 September 2001 (Temporary Postponement of the Establishment of Large 
Pharmacies in North Sulawesi). The Province of North Sulawesi has placed restrictions 
on the ownership of pharmacies by those who do not reside in North Sulawesi, with the 
aim of protecting local entrepreneurs. The following is a summary of the contents of the 
Governor’s Decree: 
1) Licenses for Large Pharmacies in the Province of North Sulawesi are only to be 
issued to those large businesses with a central office, which own or control assets, 
and whose owners reside in North Sulawesi.  However, these licenses are not to be 
issued to those who reside outside of the Province of North Sulawesi, even though 
they may own and control assets within the province. Instead they are to be 
accorded the status of Large Pharmacy Branches or Representatives. 
2) Large pharmacies must own a building or business location in accordance with the 
stipulations on ownership status. 
3) Large local pharmacies are to be given priority as partners with the government in 
acquiring pharmacies with a value of up to Rp4 billion. 
4) The establishment of Large Pharmacy Branches has to be based on the recommendation 
of the North Sulawesi Association of Large Indonesian Pharmacies. 
5) The management of the North Sulawesi Association of Large Indonesian 
Pharmacies is to be comprised of members of the organization who originate from 
within the region. 
6) Apart from the managers, local residents are to be prioritized in the staffing of the 
Large Pharmacy Branches. 
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7) The Large Pharmacy Branches will be encouraged to form partnerships with large 
local pharmacies in order to distribute their products throughout North Sulawesi. 
This situation suggests that there is some justification for emerging concerns regarding 
policies discriminating against people from outside the region in the interest of ‘local sons’ at 
the expense of the consumer as they have to pay higher prices resulting from the less 
competitive market. 
Organized Thugs in West Java.
16
 Until now, the government could not resolve 
the problem of illegal fees in the streets imposed by both thugs and corrupt police 
officers. For instance, research in Jonggol and Purwakarta districts shows that the 
practice of thuggery in the street is very common in which each truck is required to pay 
Rp 300,000 per year to the thugs. These thugs are organized in groups that control 
specific areas. As evidence that a passing truck has “paid” the fees, usually a sticker that 
states the codename of the head of the thug groups is posted at the truck’s body. Trucks 
also became targets of illegal fees when they enter the main market in Jakarta. Fees at 
the terminal also tend to be higher than what is stated in the official rules, with an 
excuse of covering the salary of part time/volunteer workers. The rampant thuggery and 
illegal fees that are illicitly “supported” by the district government and the police shows 
the weak supremacy of the law and protection of society, especially that of the poor.  
Bureaucrats Interests Above that of the Poor in Budget allocation in West Nusa 
Tenggara.
17
 Conceptually, public policy of the government of the district of West 
Lombok in West Nusa Tenggara is focused on increasing the welfare of the poor people 
living in the district. This is done by strengthening the human capital through 
investment in health and education and improvement of economic conditions of the 
poor through “the people’s economy”, which correlates with the purpose of regional 
autonomy. However in practice, this noble mission is not carried out as planned, this 
could be seen in the budget allocation that still puts the bureaucrats’ interests above 
others.   
Some of the district government’s budget allocation policy could be seen in the 
2002 district budget (APBD). In 2002 the government of the district of West Lombok 
allocated Rp 2,6 billion for offical car purchases and Rp 780 million for official 
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motorbikes purchases. In addition, there was a huge increase in the allocation to the 
district parliament (DPRD) from Rp 2 billion (equals to Rp 3,8 million per month for 
each DPRD members) in fiscal year 2000 to Rp 3,4 million (equals to Rp 6,4 million 
per month for each DPRD members) in fiscal year 2002. At the same time, budget 
allocation for the general public interests that supposed to be the main priority of the 
district government tends to be ignored, for instances:  
1) The allocation for the village development fund which was Rp 10 million in  the 
2000 budget was not included in the 2001 district budget, with the excuse that the 
government “forgot” to include it. In the 2002 budget year the fund had been 
allocated, but until April it had not been received by the villages.  
2) In 2002, the West Lombok district allocated 2,5% of its budget for the health sector, 
which is much smaller than the amount set on in the agreement made in August 
2001 between the Health Ministry and all the district heads/majors in Indonesia. 
This agreement states that the district/city governments will allocate at least 15% of 
their budget for the health sector. According to health experts, the budget allocated 
for the health sector by the district/city governments today has sharply decreased 
from Rp 4-5 billion per year to only Rp 2-3 billion per year. This decline is 
confirmed by the statement of health center staff that after regional autonomy:  
- Shipment of medicine to the health centers take longer now than before regional 
autonomy, additionally the amount shipped is much more limited.  
- The operational fund for the health centers today is only about Rp 15 million for 
each health center. In the past years the operational fund for each health center 
was Rp 50 million, which included program assistance from the central 
government. 
- Most of the districts in West Nusa Tenggara are classified as areas prone to 
malaria and dengue fever endemics. It is very ironic that the district government 
budget for the health sector does not allocate additional funds to handle the 
problem of malaria and dengue fever. 
 
4.2.3.  Social Safety Net Program During the Crisis Era 
Other examples of how bad governance has made the poor at lost can be seen 
from the implementation of the social safety net programs. In an attempt to negate the 
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potential negative social impact of the recent economic crisis, in early 1998 the 
government of Indonesia established social safety net programs. The programs were 
intended to protect both the traditionally poor and newly poor due to the crisis, which 
may not be able to cope with impact of the crisis without outside help. The programs 
were created based on four strategies: ensuring the availability of food at affordable 
prices for the poor, supplementing purchasing power among poor households through 
employment creation, preserving access to critical social services, particularly health 
and education, and sustaining local economic activity through regional block grant 
programs and extension of small scale credits.  
Unfortunately, however, in many cases the target groups have been largely 
missed by the programs, both in terms of low coverage and being only loosely targeted 
in practice. The programs were plagued by problems in targeting the beneficiaries and 
delivering benefits to intended target groups. The programs suffered from both the 
problems of undercoverage – i.e. there were a large number of the poor who were not 
covered by the programs – and leakage – i.e. there was a large proportion of program 
benefits which went to the non-poor.
18
 Figure 2 shows the coverage of various social 
safety net programs among the poor and non-poor population. 
                                                 
18
 See Sumarto, Suryahadi, and Widyanti (2002).  
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Figure 2.  Coverage of Various Social Safety Net Programs 
 
The leakage of benefits of these programs to the non-poor is clearly a lost for the 
poor. Due to this leakage, in some cases the poor receive less benefits than they actually 
entitled to, while in other cases some of the poor were completely left out from 
receiving the benefits of the programs. Studies on the implementation on the Indonesian 
social safety net programs have pointed out that in many cases the leakage occurred due 
to bad governance at the lowest distribution points. For example, in the sale of 
subsidized rice program, once the rice reached the village level, it was up to the village 
officials how to distribute the rice to the target group. Even though they have a list of 
eligible recipients, upon which the rice allocated to the village is based, often time the 
officials decided to distribute the rice to a much larger number of people, resulting in 
lower than stipulated rice receipt by each recipient, including the poor.  
Another illuminating example is the health program. In this program, free 
medical and family planning services were provided for the poor, identified through 
‘health-cards’ which were distributed to eligible households. A health card given to a 
household can be used by all members of the household to obtain free services from 
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designated hospitals, clinics, and health care centers for medical and family planning 
purposes, including pregnancy check up and birth delivery. However, in practice, 
households which owned health-cards did not always use the cards when a household 
member visited a designated provider.
19
 Of all health-card owners who went to public 
hospital, only 60 percent used their health cards, while for community health center the 
proportion was 52 percent, for village midwife 12 percent, and for other health facilities 
31 percent. It turns out that the large degree of non-use of health-cards is that because 
some health providers refused to honor the free services for health-card owners. The 
reason is because the providers were not reimbursed based on the numbers of actual 
services performed, but instead they received an advance lump sum payment based on a 
predicted demand for services.
20
 This practice certainly hurt the poor who were in need 
of medical services.  
 
4.3.  The Impact on Poverty Reduction: More Systematic Evidence 
4.3.1.  Methods and Data 
Measuring good or bad governance quantitatively is difficult as it has many 
facets and requires a high degree of subjective judgment.21 Therefore, the most common 
method used to measure governance is to survey selected individuals, who are deemed 
knowledgeable about the situation in a certain country or region, and ask them to rank 
the governing practices in a country or region on a predetermined scale. The answers of 
all surveyed individuals in a country or region can then be used as the basis for forming 
an index of governance in the country or region. 
Since the implementation of a wide ranging district level regional autonomy 
policy in Indonesia, starting in January 2001, there has been growing interest in 
measuring good governance at the district level. Although the regional autonomy policy 
is still relatively nascent, there are already some large-scale national-level surveys on 
measuring district governance. The results of two of these surveys have been made 
public – they have been discussed in the previous section – and will be used in this 
                                                 
19
 Even though the health-card was meant only for the poor, only 35 percents of all the health-cards 
distributed were given to the poor (Saadah, Pradhan, and Sparrow 2000).  
20
 See Saadah, Pradhan, and Sparrow (2000).  
21
 See Dethier (1999).  
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study. There have been numerous other similar studies conducted on a smaller scale or 
in more localized settings.
22
 
The first large scale survey was conducted by KPPOD (Komisi Pemantauan 
Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah or the Regional Autonomy Implementation Monitoring 
Committee), a body formed by the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (KADIN). 
KPPOD was formed following a growing concern that since the implementation of the 
regional autonomy policy the district governments have rushed to issue many local 
regulations (Perda) that impose new taxes and levies in order to raise local revenues 
(PAD). 
The business community was among the most adversely impacted by this trend, 
which has negatively influenced the investment climate in the regions. In an attempt to 
counteract this trend, KADIN through KPPOD created a ranking of districts based on 
their friendliness to the business environment and investment climate (KPPOD 2002). A 
yearly award is presented to the best performing district. It is hoped that the ranking and 
award will, on the one hand, provide an incentive to the district governments to create 
an environment favorable to business and, on the other, act as signals to the business 
community in locating their investments. 
The ranking is based on a composite of district indices on local regulations, 
security, culture, and infrastructures. There are three indices on local regulations, each 
look at the aspects of production, distribution, and others. In each aspect, each district is 
assessed based on whether it has local regulations which are considered as “highly 
distortive”, “distortive”, “acceptable”, or “supportive” to the business environment. 
There are two indices on security, with the first aspect focusing on law and order (“non-
existent”, “weak”, “existent”, “good”), while the second aspect focuses on security 
disorder (“very high”, “high”, “medium”, “low”). The cultural aspects include both 
society’s attitudes and bureaucratic culture, assessing whether they are “disruptive”, 
“less conducive”, “conducive”, and “very conducive” to the investment climate. Finally, 
the infrastructure indices include both accessibility (“very difficult”, “difficult”, 
“sufficient”, “good”) as well as quality of infrastructure (“very bad”, “bad”, 
                                                 
22
 Another large-scale national-level survey has been conducted by the World Bank and Gadjah 
Mada Univerisity. However, at the time of writing this paper, the results have yet to be made public.  
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“sufficient”, “good”). KPPOD calculated these indices for a sample of 90 districts from 
all over the country.  
Among these indices, the one that is most relevant to the measurement of good 
governance, and hence will be used in this study, is the index on bureaucratic culture. 
This index is an approximation of a measure on the “quality” of district bureaucracy. 
Assessing whether the bureaucracy is “disruptive”, “less conducive”, “conducive”, and 
“very conducive” to the investment climate provides an indication of the overall quality 
of the bureaucracy. In their report, KPPOD explains that this bureaucratic culture index 
measures the degree of openness and cultural values adhered to by the district 
government as stipulated in its development policies, in particular those related to 
investments. In addition, this index measures the quality of public services from the 
local government to the business community. In measuring this index, KPPOD used 
panel judgment and expert choice methods.  
The second large-scale survey was conducted by LPEM (Lembaga Pengkajian 
Ekonomi and Masyarakat or the Institute for Social and Economic Research) at the 
Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia. As part of a study on the impact of the 
regional autonomy policy on the costs of doing business, they created six indices on 
additional costs, regional autonomy, government, infrastructure, pre-crisis security, and 
post-crisis security aspects (LPEM 2001). The indices scale from 0 to 100, with a higher 
index number indicating better quality or more favorable conditions for business. From 
these six indices, they then created a composite of cost of doing business index. LPEM 
studied the data from 60 districts and used the composite index to rank them based on 
their friendliness to the business community.  
Among these indices, the index on government was the one that most closely 
related to the measure of good governance and, hence, will be used in this study. Four 
indicators were used to measure the index on government. Those are: (1) general 
behavior/attitude of government and bureaucracy when dealing with the private sector 
(“disruptive”, “neutral”, “conducive”); (2) progress toward the relationship between 
private sector and government bureaucracy (“same”, “easier”, “harder”); (3) checks and 
balancing mechanisms within the government bureaucracy (“existent”, “non-existent”); 
and (4) the proportion of senior manager’s time spent when dealing with government 
bureaucracy (less than 15%, between 15% and 25%, between 25% and 50%, and above 
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50%). The purpose of this government index is to measure business uncertainty due to 
the behavior of government. 
Since the purpose is to assess the impact of governance on poverty reduction, 
this study also uses data on district level poverty rates, which were obtained from 
Statistics Indonesia (BPS). The official poverty statistics in Indonesia are calculated in 
three-year interval, based on data collected through the National Socio-Economic 
Survey (SUSENAS). In particular, this study uses the 1999 and 2002 data, which cover 
the periods of both the KPPOD and LPEM studies. The analyses are conducted using 
two approaches. The first approach is using descriptive analysis, which is meant as an 
exploration of the relationship between governance and poverty reduction. In the second 
approach, a multivariate analysis is conducted to confirm the relationship indicated from 
the descriptive analysis.  
 
4.3.2.  Descriptive Analysis 
Using the district governance indices from KPPOD and LPEM and district 
poverty rates from BPS, this section analyzes the impact of governance on poverty 
reduction. The focus is on the performance of districts in reducing poverty between 
1999 and 2002 and how this has varied with different levels of governance, as defined 
by both KPPOD and LPEM. 
Table 3 shows the proportional change in poverty reduction from 1999 to 2002 
by KPPOD’s index of bureaucratic culture. The table shows that none of the districts in 
the sample has a bureaucratic culture which is considered as disruptive to the business 
environment. Most of the districts, 61 out of 87, have a bureaucratic culture which is 
considered as conducive, while the rest are almost evenly divided between those which 
are less conducive and very conducive.  
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TABLE 3   
District Level Poverty Reduction Between 1999 and 2002  
by KPPOD’s Index of Bureaucratic Culture 
 
Index of Poverty Reduction (%) Number of 
Bureaucratic Culture Mean Std. Dev. Districts 
Disruptive 
 
- - 0 
Less conducive 
 
-3.41 31.53 12 
Conducive 
 
-6.95 60.66 61 
Very conducive 
 
-15.06 56.41 14 
Total 
 
-7.76 56.45 87 
 
On average, the districts in the KPPOD sample have a poverty rate in 2002 
which is proportionally around 7.8 percent lower than the poverty rate in 1999. 
Dissagregated across categories of bureaucratic culture, there is a clear indication that 
good governance affects districts’ performance on poverty reduction. The districts 
which have a less conducive bureaucratic culture have an average poverty reduction of 
3.4 percent from the original rate, while those districts with conducive bureaucratic 
culture have an average poverty reduction of around 7 percent, doubled of the rate of the 
former group. Further doubling in the rate of poverty reduction was experienced by the 
districts with a very conducive bureaucratic culture. These districts on average 
experienced a 15 percent reduction in their poverty rates during the period. 
However, this evidence that districts with better governance experienced higher 
rates of poverty reduction has to be discounted by the presence of large standard 
deviations within each category of bureaucratic culture. These large standard deviations 
make the mean of the poverty reduction rate for each category statistically insignificant 
from zero. Similarly, the differences in poverty reduction rates across categories are also 
statistically insignificant.  
Table 4 shows the same proportional change in poverty reduction from 1999 to 
2002 among the districts in the LPEM study on cost of doing business. Since the LPEM 
index of government is a continuous number ranging from 0 to 100, the districts are 
grouped into four quartiles of the index.  
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TABLE  4   
District Level Poverty Reduction Between 1999 and 2002  
by LPEM Index of Government 
 
Quartile of Index of Poverty Reduction (%) Number of 
Government Mean Std. Dev. Districts 
I  
(lowest index) 
-2.72 66.96 15 
II 
 
-5.94 71.53 15 
III 
 
-13.88 46.78 15 
IV 
(highest index) 
-6.34 40.94 15 
Total 
 
-7.22 56.68 60 
 
On average, the 60 districts in the LPEM sample have a poverty rate in 2002 
which is proportionally around 7.2 percent lower than the poverty rate in 1999. The 15 
districts with the lowest index of government, the quartile I districts, have an average 
rate of poverty reduction of 2.7 percent. Like in the KPPOD sample, the average rate of 
poverty reduction doubles in the next two quartiles, where the rate of poverty reduction 
is 5.9 percent in the quartile II districts and 13.9 percent in the quartile III districts. 
However, the average rate of poverty reduction among the 15 districts with the highest 
index of government, the quartile IV districts, is only around a half of the average rate 
of quartile III districts. 
Furthermore, similar to the KKPOD sample, there are large standard deviations 
in the rates of poverty reduction within each quartile of index of government. As before, 
the presence of these large standard deviations make the mean of poverty reduction rate 
for each quartile is not statistically significant from zero and the differences in poverty 
reduction rates across quartiles are not statistically significant either. 
 
4.3.3.  Multivariate Analysis 
The findings in the previous sub-section provide indications that governance 
affects the rate of reduction in poverty at the district level. These results, however, are 
based on simple descriptive analysis, uncontrolled from possible effects of other 
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variables. In this sub-section, a multivariate approach is exercised to control for the 
effects of other variables. In the KPPOD report, in addition to the various indices used 
to rank districts, they also publish district level data on Gross Domestic Regional 
Product (GDRP), routine and development budget, local revenues, and total population.  
Based on these data, Table 5 shows the regression results of change in poverty 
rate on two dummy variables of district governance, per capita GDRP, per capita 
routine and development budgets, and per capita local revenues. The sign of all 
coefficients of these variables makes sense, but only the coefficient of the dummy 
variable on conducive bureaucratic culture which is statistically significant. It should be 
noted, however, that the estimation has relatively low coefficient of determination (10 
percent) and F-statistic (1.46). This probably has to do with the presence of noise in the 
data, and relatively small number of observations. 
 
TABLE  5   
Regression Results of District Level Change in Poverty on Governance Indicator 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Dummy of conducive bureaucratic culture -0.0652 0.0273 
Dummy of very conducive bureaucratic culture -0.0444 0.0347 
Log of GDRP per capita -0.0128 0.0139 
Log of routine budget per capita 0.0049 0.0251 
Log of development budget per capita 0.0176 0.0173 
Log of local revenue per capita 0.0075 0.0089 
Constant -0.3272 0.2163 
Number of observations 87 
R-squared 0.0986 
F-test 1.46 
 
Nevertheless, the regression results confirm the indications from descriptive 
analysis that governance affects the rate of reduction in poverty achieved by districts. 
Districts which have conducive bureaucratic culture have a reduction in poverty rates 
which is 6.5 percentage point higher than that achieve by districts with less conducive 
bureaucratic culture. Similarly, districts with very conducive bureaucratic culture tend 
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to have higher rate of poverty reduction than districts with less conducive bureaucratic 
culture but the coefficient is not statistically significant and its magnitude is smaller 
than the coefficient for districts with conducive bureaucratic culture. 
The coefficients of the other variables indicate that – with a note that these 
coefficients are not statistically significant – economic growth tend to enhance poverty 
reduction but government budget tend stifle it. The coefficient of GDRP per capita has a 
negative sign, which indicates that districts with higher GDRP per capita tend to 
experience faster poverty reduction. This also implies that districts which strive for 
higher economic growth will achieve faster reduction in poverty. On the other hand, the 
coefficients of government budget (both routine and development) and local revenue 
variables have positive signs. These indicate that taxes and government spending are 
counterproductive to the efforts to reduce poverty, or at least they do not contribute to 
poverty reduction.  
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It is a public knowledge that bad governance is a serious problem in Indonesia. 
For a long time the country has ranked highly on the list of the most corrupt countries in 
the world. Prior to the onset of the economic crisis in mid 1997, the problem of 
governance was apparent, but it was mostly ignored. The expanding economy due to the 
high economic growth was enough for most people to compensate the lost and 
inefficiency due to bad governance. The advent of the economic crisis, however, has 
highlighted the seriousness of the problem. Some initiatives to create clean and good 
governance in the country have been put forward and tried. These efforts, however, 
have so far proved difficult and elusive.  
This study focuses on the impact of bad governance on the poor as well as on 
efforts to reduce poverty. As the group of people who are in the weakest position and 
who are most powerless in influencing decisions that affect their lives, the poor are the 
most vulnerable to the impact of bad governance. For example, when in the 1980s and 
1990s the government decided to create various marketing boards for agricultural 
commodities, which would only benefit select government cronies at the detriment of 
the farmers, the poor farmers had no choice but to live with it. Occasional protests fell 
on deaf ears or, even worse, they were met with suppressions.  
  38   
There were efforts to reform this with some successes between 1998 and 2000, 
made possible in particular by the fall of the New Order government. However, these 
were short-lived. In 2001, when decentralization and the regional autonomy policy was 
started to be implemented, various forms of market distortions which are detrimental to 
the poor were reincarnated. The only difference this time is that they were mostly 
created by the regional governments, rather than by the central government as they were 
in the past. The adverse effects on the poor, however, remain the same.  
By assembling scattered anecdotal evidence on how current and past practices of 
bad governance in Indonesia has hurt the poor, this study shows that the adverse impact 
of bad governance on the poor is real, systematically inflicts many people, and 
undermines efforts to reduce poverty in the country. More systematic analyses on the 
impact bad governance has on poverty reduction – using both descriptive and 
multivariate analyses – show some indications that indeed regions that practice good 
governance experience faster rate of poverty reduction and vice versa. However, more 
efforts are needed to separate noises from signals in the data as well as to collect better 
data and indicators of good governance to firmly establish the relationship between 
governance and poverty.  
In theory, decentralization can provide the impetus for poverty reduction and 
good governance, because civil society has the opportunity to monitor the way the 
government behaves more closely and also to bring the concerns of the poor closer to 
the government. However, if the decentralization policy is only to be exploited as a 
means of providing the regions with legitimate tools to increase the burden on the 
community without the compensation of better public services, the general public will 
have ample reasons to oppose the implementation of the decentralization policy. Signs 
of such ‘opposition’ towards local government policy are becoming apparent. If this 
continues to occur, decentralization may present a serious threat to the development of 
both national and regional economic and social development.  
Therefore, in terms of policy implication, clear guidelines need to be established 
at the national level to ensure appropriate regulation of markets and good governance by 
local authorities. This should be followed by incentives (disincentives) and systematic 
reforms which will encourage (discourage) government apparatus with reward (credible 
threat), both at the local and central level, in practicing good (bad) governance. At the 
  39   
same time the civil society needs to establish a consensus and build a coalition to 
combat bad governing practices, through for example media-campaigns, class-action, 
and evidence-based publications. 
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